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On 9th September 2020, the 5-years term of the current Polish Ombudsman
(Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich, Commissioner for Human Rights) Adam Bodnar,
has ended. The Parliament did not select a new person for this position yet. Thus,
following the Article 3.6 of the Law on the Commissioner, Professor Bodnar stays
in the office until the appointment of the new Commissioner for Human Rights.
However a group of MPs demands the Constitutional Court to delete this legal basis,
leaving the office without its head. The Court wants to decide on this case on 20th
October.
Non-judicial institutions to protect human rights exist in many European countries,
but in extremely diversified ways: Some (like Finland) have quite a large number
of them,  some have none at the national level (like Italy). Only 16 out 27 EU
member states cherish NHRI fully compliant with UN Paris Principles1)UN General
Assembly 1993 Resolution A/RES/48/134; the rest of EU countries have B status
NHRI, 2 EU countries lack any national human rights institution.. Some of those
institutions are collective bodies (commissions, institutes), others are single persons
– HR Defenders, HR Advocates, HR Commissioners – with a rich variety of their
titles. Those colorful brands notwithstanding, the roots of those institutions are
located in Sweden: The Swedish Riksdag established a Parliamentary Ombusman
(Riksdagens ombudsmän) in order to ensure that courts of law and other agencies,
as well as the public officials, are acting with accordance with laws and fulfil their
obligations properly. Since then Denmark and other Scandinavian countries, and
even so distant countries as New Zealand and Australia2)See: M. Wróblewski, First
Anglosaxon Ombudsman: case of New Zealand and Ombudsmen in the political
system of Australia, [in:] “Ombudsman institutions of Anglosaxon countries. A
comparative study”, ed. P. Mikuli, Warsaw 2017, pp. 65-88 and 179-230., have
introduced similar bodies. The ombudsman model become especially influential for
East-Central European countries with the end of the communist regimes, including
Poland as a first country in the East to establish an NHRI as such.
Ombudsman-type institutions played a vital role in the transition from a real-socialist
system to a democratic market-oriented socio-economic polity3)See: E. ##towska,
Baba na #wieczniku, Warsaw 1992.. Assuming a “shock absorber” role in the
transformation, they eased the path to capitalist realities. When governments did not
pay sufficient attention to social problems, they reminded them of basic human rights
standards, more often than not in vain. 30 years after, the liberal mainstream often
regards those NHRI as a rather awkward legacy of the transformation. Therefore it
came as a surprise that a second new life was breathed into ombudsman institutions
with a new wave of illiberal governments, which tend to treat human rights as
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a suspect ideology and therefore – consequently – rarely welcome institutional
protection thereof. Illiberal governments generally dislike critics, particularly when
expressed from a legal and fundamental rights perspective. As NHRI fought for
rule of law protection, principled defense of the independence of the judiciary, or
the rights of minority groups such as refugees and LGBT people, they met with
different forms of retaliation like budget cuts – even in times of generous financial
expenditures – or  lawsuits aimed at creating freezing effect, addresses personally
against the head of the NHRI (TVP S.A. (Polish public television) civil lawsuit of 2019
against Adam Bodnar, the Commissioner of Human Rights, see here.)).
The latest act in this drama is the motion of the group of MPs of the currently ruling
party in Poland, directed on September 15th to the Constitutional Court questioning
Article 3.6 of the Law on the Commissioner for Human Rights (CHR)4)Journal of
Laws of 2020 item 627 as amended.. This provision states that the current CHR
performs his/her duties until the new CHR takes up his/her position. According to
Article 209.1 of the Polish Constitution the Commissioner is elected by the Sejm with
the consent of the Senate for 5 years term. The Article 3.6 plays a bridging role –
when the parliament is unable to elect new CHR, the “old” Commissioner shall stay
in the office, waiting for MPs decision, for the sake of the continuation of the office
work. This provision thus not only safeguards the normal functioning of the human
rights institution, but is addressed also to citizens – they have to be sure they will get
effective aid also in the time of CHR change period.
However, MPs argue that remaining in the position of the Commissioner after the
expiry of the 5-year term of office is inconsistent with the article 2 of the Constitution
(principle of a democratic state ruled by the law, the principle of the protection of
legitimate expectations) and Article 209.1 of the Constitution (specifying the term
of office of the Ombudsman). The applicants indicate that this provision was not
amended after the 1997 Constitution entered into force and the actual duration of the
term of office of CHR goes beyond the constitutional five-year term of office. This,
in their view, violates the prohibition of creating a law that would introduce so-called
deceptive legal institutions. Moreover, the applicants underline that the Constitution
does not foresee the possibility of specifying the length of the Commissioner’s term
of office by means of a statute and does not state expressive verbis the need to
ensure the continuity of the HRC’s work. The acting commissioner, according to
their argument, performs his duties beyond the constitutional term of office and thus
acts not as a constitutional body but as a falsus procurator, exposing citizens to
unforeseeable negative effects, all of which violates the “dignity of the office”.
The Commissioner for Human Rights took the advantage of joining the case before
the Constitutional Court. On 30 September the HRC presented its position, claiming
that the Law on the CHR is in compliance with the Constitution. Selection and
appointment rules, such as Article 3.6, aim to ensure continuity of the institution
and independence from the government. It is the responsibility of the appointing
authorities (the parliament) to ensure a proper and timely appointment of the new
Commissioner. According to Paris Principles and Venice Principles5)Principles
on the Protection and Promotion of the Ombudsman Institution (“The Venice
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Principles”), adopted by the Venice Commission at its 118th Plenary Session
(Venice, 15-16 March 2019), CDL-AD(2019)005-e. such arrangements should
be in place so that the post of the head of any National Human Rights Institution
does not stay vacant for any significant period of time. What is more, a lot of
European countries apply similar legal prorogation mechanism as regards the
NHRIs in the transition period, ranging from Albania, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and
Hercegovina, Czech Republic, Denmark, Georgia, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania,
Macedonia, Montenegro and North Macedonia, up to Portugal, Russia, Sweden,
Spain, Romania and Ukraine. Similar mechanisms are also applied in Poland as
regards the President of the Central Bank, the President of the Supreme Audit
Chamber and the Commissioner for Children Rights.
Interestingly, the case K 20/20 will be decided by the Constitutional Court on 20th
October – just a month after the MPs lodged their complaint (other cases wait years
to be adjudicated), without an obligatory 30-days notice about the hearing, with one
of the persons not entitled to adjudicate, according the previous Constitutional Court
case law and repeated objections from the HRC, in the panel.
If the Constitutional Court is to declare Article 3.6. of the HRC Law unconstitutional,
what will be the consequences? Declaring the provision unconstitutional means
that the current HRC will not have a legal basis to perform his duties until a new
Commissioner is elected in a constitutional way. The results of such a judgment
may however be even more serious, affecting the ability of Polish NHRI to protect
fundamental rights. In a positive scenario the public authorities will cooperate with
the office even when vacant, allowing it to conduct business as usual. In a more
pessimistic scenario, however, the actions of the CHR office may be deemed legally
unfounded. This may negatively affect citizens expecting prompt and effective
intervention of the CHR office in cases of a violation of their human rights. One
should also remember that the CHR in Poland performs additional functions: it is an
independent national equality body under the EU Anti-Discrimination Directives, a
monitoring body under the UN CRPD and the National Preventive Mechanism under
OPCAT.
Some see the motion to the Constitutional Court and later possible consecutive
amendment of the on the HRC a “shortcut” to fill the Commissioner position, to
decrease its status and to circumvent the Senate in the process of nomination of
the new head of the HRC office. However there is still clear, transparent and fully
constitutional way to nominate a new Commissioner for Human Rights – its election
by the Sejm with the consent of the Senate. Just on Sunday, the Polish tennis
champion Iga #wi#tek won the French Open. She united nearly all Poles by her great
success. One may still hope that there is room for a success in the area of human
right protection – a nomination of the Commissioner who will unite people at least in
part so effectively as she did.
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